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This paper analyzes the response of secondary schools to changes in their quality ratings. 
The current analysis is the first to address the impact of quality scores that have been 
published by a newspaper (Trouw), rather than public interventions. Our research design 
exploits the substantial lags in the registration and publication of the Trouw scores and that 
takes into account all possible outcomes of the ratings, instead of the lowest category only. 
Overall, we find evidence that school quality performance does respond to Trouw quality 
scores. Both average grades increase and the number of diplomas go up after receiving a 
negative score. For schools that receive the most negative ranking, the short-term effects 
(one year after a change in the ranking of schools) of quality transparency on final exam 
grades equal 10% to 30% of a standard deviation compared to the average of this variable. 
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1. Introduction 
Ranking and accountability have become increasingly common in the delivery of public 
services. One of the most prominent examples is the state-level accountability system in the US 
education system which has been introduced by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001. 
There is strong evidence that schools do respond to the NCLB accountability systems by 
improving their test scores (Carnoy & Loeb, 2003; Hanushek & Raymond, 2004; Jacob, 2005; 
Dee & Jacob 2009) and by changing the allocation of their resources (Rouse, Hannaway, 
Goldhaber & Figlio, 2007; Craig, Imberman & Perdue, 2009; Chiang, 2009; Bacolod, Dinardo 
& Jacobson, 2009).
1 Part of the gains in measured performance can however also be attributed 
to gaming activities, typically by removing low-performing students from participation in 
exams (Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005). The general picture is that schools respond to 
accountability pressure by increasing average test scores of their students, particularly when the 
threat of sanctions is present. For studies on the overall effects of accountability systems, school 
response estimates range from 20 to 40% of the standard deviation of test scores (Hanushek & 
Raymond, 2004; Dee & Jacob, 2005). Estimates are generally smaller when authors focus on 
the specific impact of sanctions on failing schools (Figlio & Rouse 2006; Chiang 2009). 
  This paper investigates the response of Dutch secondary schools to ranking scores, 
measured in terms of their overall test and diploma performance. For this purpose, we use a 
sample of 3,032 unique school tracks observed from 1996-2006. The quality rating system has 
been initiated in 1997 by the daily newspaper Trouw, so as to inform parents and their children 
on the quality of secondary schools. Trouw scores by school track are based on several 
objective quality indicators, such as the average grades in final centralized exams of the 
students, the percentage of students who obtain a diploma without delay, the percentage 
students who end up in a lower or higher school track than initially expected and some other 
quality indicators that differed from year to year. In order to obtain an indicator for value added 
 
1 In contrast, there is a limited literature on the effects of school quality information on school choice behaviour. In a 
field experiment, Hastings & Weinstein (2008) find parents of low-income families to respond to simplified information 
on academic achievements and admission odds if they had never received any explicit information before. Koning & 
Van der Wiel (2010) find school choice for secondary education in the Netherlands to respond to quality information 
particularly for schools that offer the highest school track in secondary education.   2 
by schools, the ‘gross’ quality score that follows from combining the three measures is 
corrected for the percentage of students with low parental income and from immigrant 
neighbourhoods. The exact control variables Trouw used changed from year to year, just as the 
weights attached to the quality indicators and the boundary values for the quality categories. 
  The primary interest in our analysis lies in the response of schools to changes in their 
ratings over time. As quality scores are predominantly driven by (lagged) test results and 
passing rates, the key question is whether schools that receive a negative quality score tend to 
improve these quality indicators. Likewise, we analyse the long-term effects on quality 
indicators for schools that receive a positive quality score. In doing this, we contribute to the 
literature in two respects.  
  First, to the best of our knowledge, the current analysis is the first to address the impact 
of quality scores that have been published by a newspaper, rather than public interventions that 
aim to track and improve failing schools. Until now, the literature on private initiatives by 
newspapers or magazines has predominantly focused on the hospital industry, like in Pope 
(2009) who analyzes the effects of the “America’s Best Hospitals” publication of the US News 
and World Report (Pope, 2009). The Trouw score addresses a broad range of performance 
outcomes, including schools that are confronted with the rare event of receiving the lowest and 
most negative ranking (‘--’) and schools that are awarded with the highest and most positive 
ranking category (‘++’). Our outcomes are thus informative on the effectiveness of private 
initiatives to increase school quality transparency.  
  The second contribution of this paper concerns the research design that is employed. 
As school quality indicators are the input of overall ranking scores, estimating the impact of 
ranking scores on future quality indicators raises endogeneity concerns. The recent literature 
therefore usually employs regression discontinuity designs on the rating boundaries for school 
performance to estimate the impact of ‘rating shocks’ (Figlio and Rouse, 2006; Craig et al., 
2009; Chiang, 2009). Discontinuity regressions are useful if the ratings follow from a sharp 
design, with full information on the relevant underlying quality indicators, their weights and the 
rating boundaries. Notable disadvantages however are that local average treatment estimates are 
based on limited supports and are usually confined to a small group of failing schools (Blundell   3 
& Dias, 2009). Moreover, as the construction of quality scores is fully transparent, schools may 
try to avoid getting below threshold values, which in turn confounds the impact estimates. 
Within the context of the current analysis, however, the construction of the ratings is not fully 
transparent, with some quality variables and their corresponding weights being unobserved. We 
therefore follow an alternative research strategy that exploits the substantial lags in the 
registration and publication of the Trouw scores and that takes into account all possible 
outcomes of the ratings, instead of the lowest category only. More specifically, the registration 
of (all) the underlying quality indicators by the Dutch Inspectorate takes two years, and the 
subsequent processing by Trouw another six months. As a result, the size of endogeneity biases 
in impact estimates of Trouw-scores due to serial correlation in quality indicators is limited. 
Moreover, given the long time period that is under consideration, we can both estimate the 
short-term and long-term effects of changes in Trouw-scores. In doing this, we extend the recent 
analysis of Chiang (2009), who studies the medium-run effects of accountability pressure, that 
is, in the second and third year after the occurrence of sanctions. 
  Overall, we find evidence that school quality performance does respond to Trouw 
quality scores. Both average grades increase and the number of diplomas go up after receiving a 
negative score. These responses cannot be attributed to gaming activities of the school board as 
an improvement is also observed in the gaming-proof quality indicators. For schools that 
receive the most negative ranking, the short-term effects of quality transparency on final exam 
grades equal 10% to 30% of a standard deviation compared to the average of this variable. The 
estimated long run impacts are roughly equal to the short-term effects that are measured one 
year after a change in the ranking of schools. Moreover, it seems the strongest (positive) long-
term effects occur at schools that receive the most negative ranking. This suggests that the most 
negative ranking works like a wake up call to schools. Reversely, schools with the most positive 
ranking feel less urgency to maintain high levels of quality. 
 
This papers proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the Dutch institutional context, the 
derivation of the Trouw ranking scores and presents some characteristics of the data at hand. 
Section 3 presents our research design and Section 4 the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.   4 
 
2.  Institutions and data 
For our analysis, two datasets are merged at the level of individual school track locations, 
resulting in a total sample of 20,696 observations.
2 First, we have extracted information from 
the administrative records of the Inspectorate. These data include the number of plants per 
school group, school denomination,
3 student numbers and performance indicators per school 
track, like the average grade scores and average fractions of diplomas that were obtained.
4 It 
should be noted that there were major reforms for lower secondary (vocational) education in the 
Netherlands in 2002, causing the school track classification here to change and thus restricting 
the observed time period per stratum. We therefore restrict the sample to the three general 
education tracks that existed throughout the sample period. School tracks include the 
academically oriented school track that lasts six years, of which a diploma guarantees admission 
to university (in Dutch: ‘vwo’); a less difficult track that lasts five years, of which a diploma 
guarantees admission to a ‘hogeschool’ (comparable to community colleges; in Dutch: ‘havo’); 
and there is the track that provides for a general, basic education that lasts four years (in Dutch: 
‘vmbo-gt’). 
  Second, we have copied all quality scores that Trouw has published since 1998. Trouw 
was the first media outlet to publish rankings of secondary schools and by now it is commonly 
acknowledged as the major source of information on secondary schools.
5 As we will argue in 
the next section, the delays in the reporting system of Trouw enable us to identify the specific 
effect of this quality information, next to other sources of information. Each year Trouw 
receives quality information from the Dutch Inspectorate of Education, and subsequently 
determines the ranking categories of school tracks. Trouw ranking scores are observed for 
 
2 Thus, multiple observations per school originate from schools offering different school tracks.  
3 Within the Dutch school system, denominations include protestant schools, catholic schools, public schools and others 
(see Table 2.1).  
4 We have enriched these data with the number of inhabitants in the municipalities the school tracks were located. 
5 Since 2000, the quality information that serves as the input of the Trouw scores is made publicly available on the 
internet by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. The way this information is presented however  with relatively many 
details and without a summary score  hampers a direct comparison between schools. Next to this, in 2001 the weekly 
magazine Elsevier started publishing similar rankings as Trouw, using quality levels that are averaged over three years 
and without using controls to obtain measures for value added. See Dijkstra, Karsten, Veenstra & Visscher (2001) for 
more information on the Trouw outlet.   5 
17,229 school tracks in our (full) sample. Missing observations mostly stem from the fact that 
schools were considered too small to obtain a reliable overall quality score. There is no 
evidence that selection effects determine which observations are missing.
6 Although the ratings 
were based on information of the Inspectorate, these could not be inferred straightaway. We 
return to this issue later on.  
  Table 1 presents summary statistics for the selected sample of secondary schools in 
1996-2006, both for the full sample and the sample of schools that are observed over the full 
time period (i.e. the balanced panel). It should be noted here that the full sample that is 
presented in the table exceeds the sample that can be used to estimate the actual impact of the 
quality scores which starts in 1999, as this requires a lag of three years.
7 In the full sample we 
have on average 6.5 yearly observations per combination of school and school track, with 11 
yearly observations at maximum. Generally, differences between the means of both samples are 
only modest. A substantial fraction of schools offer all (three) school tracks and there is no 
dominant type of denomination. Furthermore, the Inspectorate has defined underprivileged (in 
Dutch: ‘cumi’-students) as students living at zip codes with a relatively high fraction of ethnic 
minorities.
8 Schools also receive additional funding for each underprivileged student. 
 
 
6 We tested for selection effects by estimating a two step Heckman model. The first stage entailed a Probit regression on 
the occurrence of observing the Trouw score, and in the second stage we included the first stage Mills ratio to estimate 
the Trouw ranking scores. This did not yield significant parameter estimates for the Mills ratio.  
7 This causes the sample size to reduce to 15,201 observations. Moreover, as we do not observe all quality scores in 
these years, the effective sample size in our regressions is 12,451. 
8  It should be noted that the definition of cumi-students has changed in 2003 and in 2005. The average value of this 
variable is therefore not presented in Table 2.1. In the estimation of our models, we therefore control for this variable by 
allowing its impact to vary from year to year.   6 
Table 1  Summary statistics of school and school track data: full sample and balanced panel (1996-2006) 
  Full sample (N=20,696) Balanced panel 
(N=14,641) 




Share of School tracks    
Lowest general track (VMBO-gt)  0.418 (0.493) 0.379  (0.485) 
Middle track (HAVO)  0.291 (0.454) 0.302  (0.459) 
‘Academic’ track (VWO)  0.291 (0.454) 0.319  (0.466) 
School tracks per school
a    
1 school track  0.415 (0.492) 0.347  (0.476) 
2 school tracks  0.146 (0.353) 0.153  (0.360) 
3 school tracks  0.439 (0.496) 0.501  (0.500) 
Market characteristics
a     
Municipality population  126,646 (178,868) 127,127  (181,260) 
Municipality population, aged 10-20   13,866 (18,268) 13,836  (18,448) 
Number of schools in municipality  9.936 (12.904) 9.971  (13.061) 
School characteristics
a    
Denomination: protestant  0.225 (0.418) 0.234  (0.424) 
Denomination: Catholic  0.269 (0.443) 0.276  (0.447) 
Public schools  0.266 (0.442) 0.284  (0.451) 
Denomination: other  0.240 (0.427) 0.206  (0.404) 
Number of students per school track   202.7 (132.3) 228.8  (128.3) 
Number of students per school
a
  2,014.4 (1272.8) 1,864.4 (1,119.4) 
Inflow new students per school
a 181.3 (102.8) 193.8  (101.8) 
School performance    
Diploma without delay (%)  70.929 (16.572) 70.087  (16.118) 
Grade final exams   6.346 (0.289) 6.360  (0.271) 
Grade interim exams  6.602 (0.282) 6.609  (0.275) 
Junior years performance (first to third class)  100.071 (9.721) 99.972  (8.903) 
Quality scores
b    
Most negative ranking: ‘--‘  0.014 (0.115) 0.012  (0.111) 
Negative ranking: ‘-‘  0.182 (0.386) 0.179  (0.383) 
Neutral ranking: ‘0’  0.605 (0.489) 0.615  (0.487) 
Positive ranking: ‘+’  0.191 (0.393) 0.187  (0.389) 
Most positive ranking: ‘++’  0.009 (0.092) 0.007  (0.085) 
a Average and standard deviation is computed per school (not per school track). 
b Note that the Trouw quality scores are unobserved for the first two years in our sample (1996 and 1997). Moreover, in subsequent years 
on average about 14% of the yearly observations per school track is missing.  
   7 
 
  The Dutch Inspectorate of Education monitors school quality with a set of three 
indicators that also are inputs for the Trouw rating. The first indicator is the average percentage 
of students that leaves the school with a diploma without any delay, measured from the third 
year onwards (with an average per school equal to 70%). This means that there is no room for 
schools to game their results by excluding low-performing students from final exams in the last 
year. Second, the Inspectorate monitors the average final exam grades at each school track. The 
grade that determines whether one receives a diploma is the average grade that is obtained in 
the final, centralized exams and in the interim school-level exams. Interim exams are carried out 
halfway through the final school year, with individual teachers having the discretion to 
construct and correct the exams. In contrast, final exams are nationally organized and the 
correction is carried out by teachers at other schools. The average test score at the final exams 
equals 6.4 (out of 10 points) for the full sample and 6.6 for the interim exams. This suggests 
that teachers use their discretion in the interim exams to raise grade scores to some extent, thus 
increasing the odds of passing the final exams at the end of the school year. Third, the 
Inspectorate measures the net percentage of students in third year that are in a school track that 
is either below what the child’s primary school had advised, or above. This ‘junior-years 
performance’ is documented as schools could otherwise game their results by forcing students 
into lower school tracks. A score of 100% indicated that on average students are in their 
predicted school track.  
  We stated earlier that the Trouw ranking scores cannot be recovered from the 
performance indicators that are provided to us by the Inspectorate. This is partly because the 
Inspectorate provides more detailed information to Trouw than to us and partly because Trouw 
has adapted their scoring method from year to year. For both ourselves and Trouw it was 
impossible to reconstruct this method, particularly as journalist turnover rates were high over 
the years. We only know that the three objective quality indicators were recurrent inputs for the 
rankings score that followed from clustering analysis. Moreover, in an attempt to control for the 
‘quality’ of students Trouw corrects the overall score in all years for the fraction of students 
from predominantly immigrant neighbourhoods. For some years these variables were   8 
supplemented with additional control variables, particularly on parental income, so as to obtain 
more accurate measurements for value-added by schools. We also know that for some years the 
percentage of students retaking classes was also taken into account as an additional quality 
indicator. As a result of these seemingly random changes in the calculation procedures, school 
boards were thus uncertain about how their quality performance, which they did observe in 
advance, would affect their overall Trouw quality rankings.
9 
 
Table 2  Quality indicators per ranking score (full sample on school-track level) 































































Table 1 makes apparent that 1.4% of the schools received the most negative ranking and 0.9% 
the most positive one. The majority of schools were in the average category (60.5%) and the 
remaining schools were distributed almost evenly over the other two categories. Table 2 mirrors 
the relation between the quality indicators and the resulting quality scores. The spread between 
the diploma rates is substantial, with 49% for schools in the most negative category and 81% 
for schools in the most positive category. The relation between the rankings and the interim 
exam grades is less marked, suggesting that schools with lower ratings use their discretion to 
compensate their lower performance on this performance measure (De Lange & Dronkers 
2007). Finally, Table 3 shows the dynamics of the Trouw ratings per school, measured as year-
to-year transition probabilities. Schools with the lowest and highest quality score are not very 
 
9 Ordered Probit estimation of the Trouw ranking scores with the observed quality indicators and the fraction of cumi-
students (with time varying coefficients), explains about 70% of the observed variance. With constant weights, the 
explained variance is 61%. Thus, it seems ranking scores are to a large extent driven by variables other than the 
observed ones. Moreover, the weights that were attached to the observed quality and controls variables vary over the 
years.   9 
likely to receive a similar ranking in the next period. In particular, only about 8% of schools 
stay at the most negative ranking, whereas 49% moves to the middle category or higher than 
that. The extreme event of receiving the most negative or most positive rankings is thus largely 
transitory (see also Dijkstra et al., 2001). 
 
Table 3  Transition probabilities between ranking scores (1998-2006); rows = origins, columns = 
destinations. 
 Unknown Most 
negative 




Unknown 65.7 0.5 7.1 19.7 6.5  0.6 
Most negative (‘--’)  9.7 8.3 45.2 32.7 4.2  0.0 
Negative (‘-’)  7.5 2.4 32.9 51.0 6.2  0.1 
Average (‘0’)  5.5 0.6 14.8 64.2 14.7  0.3 
Positive (‘+’)  5.9 0.1 6.3 52.3 33.8  1.7 




3. Empirical  strategy 
3.1 The  baseline  model 
 
A common assumption that underlies most studies on the response to school rankings is that 
schools are ex-ante incompletely informed on their overall ranking position. Within the context 
of the Dutch ranking system, this means that the computation process by Trouw differs from 
one year to the other and is not known by school boards. Schools also are not aware of their 
relative position vis-à-vis the other schools with the same school track, with small differences in 
the overall relative latent performance outcome having potentially strong consequences for their 
rankings. The event of receiving a low quality score may therefore increase the awareness of 
schools of their relative quality level and trigger them to change their policies. In our analysis, 
we argue that such changes in ratings are unanticipated (‘rating shocks’), which enables us to 
obtain consistent estimates of the effects of Trouw scores on quality measures. The ranking 
scores of Trouw are also reported with a lag of three years, rendering it likely that endogeneity 
effects due to serial correlation in quality measures are only small.    10 
  The baseline specification we use for quality indicator Q
k (k = 1,..K) measured for 
school i (i = 1 ,.., I ) with track j (j=1,...,J ) at time t (t = 1 ,.., T ) is: 
 
(1)   Q
k ijt  =  α
k Rij,t-3  +  Xit β
k  +  ν




with the diploma received percentages, the final and interim exam scores and the junior years 
performance percentages as the four quality outcome measures under investigation (K = 4). 
Matrix X includes the time varying municipality and school characteristics that are, amongst 
others, presented in Table 1, together with yearly time dummies. R indicates the ranking 
category the school track receives (R = 1,..5), with an impact coefficient of α
k for quality 
indicator k. As we have shown earlier, Trouw labels these five ordinal measures as ‘--’, ‘-’, ‘0’, 
‘+’ and ‘++’, respectively. In the baseline specification, we furthermore start by assuming that 
the impact of one higher ranking category is equal for all categories.
10 Vector ν
k  indicates 
school track fixed effects per quality indicator k. The relevant stratum we use here is that of 
school tracks, which are indexed as combinations of i and j. Finally, ε represents residuals that 
are assumed to be identically and independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
k  for 
each quality variable. The baseline equation (1) is estimated with school track fixed effects, 
where standard errors are corrected for clustering effects at the level of school tracks. 
 
3.2  Identification and robustness 
The key challenge in estimating the impact of rankings is that time demeaned values of Trouw 
scores are correlated with time demeaned school quality measures. Time demeaning follows 
from using school track fixed effects. Given the limited number of time observations per school 
track, this strategy is likely to yield inconsistent estimates of our parameter of interest α (see 
e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, pp.270).
11 To illustrate this point, suppose we focus on school tracks 
with high absence rates of teachers in one particular year, which is an omitted variable that 
 
10 This corresponds to the linearity assumption of Pope (2009) who studies the effects of rankings on the number of 
hospital clients. 
11 In particular, for fixed effects estimation it is well known that the correlation coefficient of residuals in equation (1) 
will be equal to  1/(T1)  (Wooldridge, 2002).   11 
causes the residual terms in our equation to be low. This school therefore receives the most 
negative ranking at time t. Given the limited time span school track is observed, the low 
residuals will be partially misperceived as low school track fixed effects. Conditional on the 
low score at time t, the expected values of the other year observations will thus be higher than 
the fixed effect estimate. More generally, high (low) quality scores for schools with high (low) 
ranking scores are partially misperceived as high (low) fixed effects, with the remaining 
variation unjustly attributed to the ratings. Ranking responses will be thus biased from zero. In 
the literature, this effect is often referred to as the ‘mean reversion bias’ (see also Chiang, 
2009). 
    With the data at hand, we can easily infer the size of this (negative) time demeaning 
bias. For this purpose, we first specify the ranking score Rijt for school track ij at time t as  
 




ijt  +  Zit ηt
k   +  υij +  ψijt . 
 
with γ
k indicating the approximate weight of quality indicator k in the ranking and Z as a matrix 
including yearly dummies and the fraction of underprivileged students for school i at time t. 
Note that the impact of the fraction of underprivileged is allowed to vary over time. υ indicates 
school track fixed effects and ψ represents residuals that are assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
ψ.  




ij as the school track time demeaned values of the quality 
measure k and the residual terms of equation (1), respectively, we can show that the coefficient 
estimate of α
k will have a bias that is equal to 
 




ij )          =     γ
k  E ( Q
k
ij,t-3   Q
k




ij )         =  
   
  =        γ
k  E ( ε
k
ij,t-3   ε
k




ij )    =      γ
k σ
2
k   / T  ,      
 
for k = 1,..K, with Rij indicating the mean values of the ranking scores, ε
k
ij representing the 
residual terms and Q
k
ij  reflecting the quality measures per school track ij over time. The   12 
equation makes apparent that the bias in the coefficient estimate if α
k is determined by the 
weight of the indicator in the ranking score, the variance of the quality indicator, and the time 
span covered by the data.. 
  We propose three research strategies to address the time demeaning bias in estimation 
equation (1). Our first research strategy entails the calculation of the time demeaning bias itself. 
This means we first perform a fixed effects estimation of both equation (1) of all quality 
measures k (k = 1,..K) and of equation (2) with school track fixed effects. In doing this, we 
obtain coefficient estimates of γ
k and σ
2
k  (k = 1,..K)  that are necessary to calculate the bias 
presented in equation (3). Next, the bias estimate is compared to and subtracted from the value 
estimate of α
k that is obtained from direct estimation of (1). 
  Our second and third strategy draw further upon the idea that the bias in equation (3) 
originates from the correlation between the time demeaned value of the residual terms of quality 
measure k, measured at time t and that time t-3. In order to control for this, the second strategy 
enriches the equation (1) with Q
k
ij,t-3 as and additional explanatory variable. The coefficient 
estimate of this variable then accounts for the spurious serial correlation that follows from time 
demeaning. Obviously, the coefficient estimate will itself be inconsistent, but the biasing effect 
on γ
k is controlled for.
12 The third robustness strategy also uses a lagged variable approach to 
remove the time demeaning bias, but now with the ‘gross’ Trouw score as control variable. 
Recall from the previous section that this ranking score follows from the weighted average of 
performance outcomes, but without controlling for student characteristics. Including the gross 
Trouw score as an additional control variable thus results in quality response estimates that are 
identified from variation in the Trouw rankings that originate from the conversion from ‘gross’ 
measures to ‘net’ or value added measures. As a consequence, we control for alternative sources 
of information that may be correlated with the gross Trouw score. 
 
 
12 Including the lagged value of the quality measure also controls for biases resulting from ‘true’ serial correlation in the 
error terms. To illustrate this, suppose the residuals in equation (1) follow an autoregressive process with a parameter 
value ρk for k = 1,..K. As a result, the bias in the fixed effects coefficient estimate of γk will consist of a time demeaning 
bias and a bias due to ‘true’ serial correlation: γ
k σ
2
k   [ 1 / {(1 ρk)T }   +  ρk
3 / ( 1 ρk
2 ) ] . By including the (three 
period) lagged value of the quality measure k, both the inconsistency due to demeaning and that of ‘true’ serial 
correlation are controlled for.   13 
3.3  Highest and lowest rankings: short and long-term effects 
It may well be that the quality rankings have a longer lasting impact on quality performance 
than just in the year after the announcement of new Trouw scores (Chiang, 2009). Changes in 
policies and investments usually take longer than one year to be completed, which calls for an 
estimation approach that would incorporate the possibility of more persistent quality effects. To 
analyze the persistency of all rankings scores jointly is however cumbersome, as school tracks 
usually receive a sequence of rankings that are either negative, average or positive. It thus 
would be unclear how such a sequence of ranking scores would drive permanent changes in 
quality. By contrast, the extreme events of receiving the most negative or most positive 
rankings are much more clear-cut and thus more informative in this respect. More specifically, 
in the sample about 6% (4%) of the school tracks have received the most negative (positive) 
ranking in the time period under investigation without any overlap between these two ‘extreme’ 
categories. We will therefore analyse the persistency of school responses after they enter into 
the most negative category (‘--’) or the most positive category (‘++’). We thus extend equation 
(1) with dummy values that equal one from the moment the event of receiving the school 
receives the most negative or most positive ranking. The coefficients of these dummies can be 
scaled (i.e. divided by two
13) so as to obtain value estimates that can be compared with those for 
the short-term ranking responses.  
 
 
4. Estimation  results 
4.1 The  baseline  model 
 
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates of our baseline model for the four quality measures, i.e. 
the diplomas without delay, the grades of final and interim exams and the junior year’s 
performance. Overall, we find that higher (lower) Trouw ranking scores lower (increase) the 
percentage of students receiving a diploma and the average grades of students, with values 
 
13 Note that both the most negative and most positive ranking score differ from the (average) reference group by two 
categories. Thus, when comparing this result to the short-term effects, the coefficient estimate of the permanent 
response should be divided by two.   14 
equal to about 5% of the standard deviations of the respective scores. As the most negative 
(positive) ranking is two positions below (higher than) the average, this means that school 
tracks in this category improve (worsen) their quality performance with about 10% of the 
standard deviation. We thus conclude that school tracks with high rankings tend to lower their 
efforts and those schools with low rankings are triggered to improve their performance. In 
contrast, we find no significant effect for the junior years performance score. Presumably this 
can be explained by the fact that this score measures performance over three consecutive school 
years, whereas the ranking responses are measured as one-year, transitory effects. It also should 
be noted that the ranking score estimate in the interim exam regression is lower than that in the 
final exam regression. As the centralized score leaves no room for gaming, this suggests that 
school tracks that received lower rankings did not engage in additional gaming activities to 
improve their quality performance in future periods. In particular, school tracks could have 
increased the interim exam scores to improve the percentage of students receiving a diploma 
which is one of the inputs of the Trouw formula. Such effects are however seemingly small. 
    As to the remaining estimation results in Table 4, an important finding is that 60 to 
75% of the unexplained variance is attributed to school track fixed effects. As these effects are 
positively correlated with the ranking scores, excluding school track fixed effects would yield 
response coefficients that are biased upwards.
14 Furthermore, the school quality measures are 
sometimes lower in municipalities with many school tracks and with smaller schools. Although 
we cannot qualify these effects as causal in this context, these findings are in line with 
Dijkgraaf, Gradus & De Jong (2009) who also find quality measures to decrease in the scale of 
schools. Finally, for three of the quality measures the yearly time dummies reveal an upward 
trend. This is not the case for the final exam scores, which are probably less prone to gaming. 
 
 
14 This is confirmed when estimating equation (1) for the quality outcomes without school track fixed effects.    15 
Table 4        School track fixed effects estimation of quality measures (1999-2006)
a,b; standard errors corrected 










































































































Variance ( σk )  8.043 1.643 1.708 6.903 
Fraction variance due to FE  0.741 0.676 0.671 0.605 
R-squared 0.089 0.058 0.004 0.028 
a We also included the fraction of underprivileged students as controls in the regressions. As the definition of this variable changed during 
the period under investigation, the effect of this variable was allowed to vary per year. 
b We also have estimated the baseline model for subsamples of school level types. This yields coefficient estimates of the coefficient 
estimates of the ranking responses that do not differ significantly than those obtained for the full sample. The results of these regressions 
are available upon request.  
 
 
4.2 Robustness  checks 
 
We argued earlier that three research strategies can be followed to test for the robustness of the 
baseline model: (i) calculating the time demeaning bias; (ii) re-estimating equation (1) with the 
three-year lagged variable of the quality outcome as an additional control variable; of (iii) re-
estimation equation (1) with the ‘gross’ Trouw score as an additional control variable. Table 5   16 
shows the outcomes that follow from these strategies. Generally, the estimated biases appear 
small and do not change our result of ranking scores affecting the diploma and interim and final 
exam scores. Note that the time demeaning bias for the interim exam grades is almost close to 
zero, as there is no weight attached to this variable in the Trouw score. The finding that any 
inconsistencies due to  true or spurious  serial correlation are small is confirmed in the 
second and third estimation strategies. That is, the coefficient estimates for diploma and grade 
scores become somewhat smaller and are close to the corrected coefficient estimates that follow 
from the first estimation strategy. It is only for the junior years’ performance measure that both 
robustness checks change our findings. When controlling for the time demeaning bias here, 
weak evidence emerges that higher rankings increase the junior year’s performance.  
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Robustness check (i): bias calculation    





























Robustness check (ii): controlling for lagged values    
















Robustness check (iii): controlling for gross Trouw 
score 
  

















a Standard errors for the time demeaning biases were obtained using the Delta method.   17 
 
4.3  Short- and long-term effects 
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of school responses to the most positive or most negative 
quality rankings, with the distinction between short-term and long-term effects. As argued in 
the previous section, we add dummy variables capturing persistency effects after the occurrence 
of receiving the most negative or the most positive ranking. In contrast to the baseline model 
with linear effects, this also allows us to address the possibility of asymmetry in the effects of 
these rankings. When conducting the specification, the reference group exists of the pooled 
sample of school tracks with average, positive and negative rankings; this group gradually 
decreases to about 90% of the sample in 2006. From the table, we infer the following findings. 
First, although the (scaled) short-term coefficient values of the responses to extreme rankings 
tend to be stronger than in the baseline model, differences are small and insignificant. 
Aggregating the positive and negative ranking categories to the (average) reference group thus 
does not affect our short-term response estimates substantially. Although the smaller treatment 
group of schools with the most negative or positive ranking decreases the efficiency of our 
estimates, the estimates are remain significant in most cases. 
    Our second general finding is that the size of (negative) quality response estimates 
increases when distinguishing between short and long-term impacts. This suggests that in the 
model with short-term effects only, permanent changes in quality outcomes are partially 
absorbed in the school track fixed effects, causing the short-term impact to be underestimated. 
Thus, estimates for the short-term impact in the baseline model are biased towards zero. In the 
model with long-term effects, we find coefficient estimates of both the short and long-term 
impacts to be negative for all performance measures and significant in most cases as well. The 
long-term impacts are somewhat stronger for the diploma and final exam grade scores. This is 
in line with Chiang (2009), who finds short and medium-term effects to be roughly of equal 
size. For the diploma and final exam grade scores the estimated short and long-term impacts 
vary between 25% and 35% of their respective standard deviations, whereas the interim exam 
score is about 10% of the standard deviation (both in the short and in the long term). For the   18 
junior year’s performance, we only find the long-term response estimate to be significant and 
equal to about 20% of its standard deviation. 
    Finally, the lower part of Table 6 shows that both short and long-term quality 
responses are strongest for school tracks receiving the most negative ranking. For instance, the 
permanent increase in final exam grades for school tracks receiving the most negative ranking 
equals 1.14 compared to the reference group (= -/- 2 × -/- 0.57), whereas the decrease in final 
exam grades for school tracks receiving the most positive ranking equals 0.64 (= 2 × 0.32). We 
thus conclude that responses to ‘rating shocks’ are not symmetric.  
 
Table 6  Coefficient estimates of quality responses: short and long-term impacts based on ‘most 
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Specification with short and long-term effects (scaled)  
















Specification with short- and long-term as well as separate  effects for ‘most negative’ and ‘most positive’ 
rankings 
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5. Discussion 
The general picture that emerges from our analysis is that schools do respond to quality 
information by changing their quality outcomes in the short and in the long run. The size of 
long-term effects seems in line with studies that evaluate the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act 
that was enacted in US states, with values ranging from 10 to 30% of the standard deviation of 
performance outcomes. Having said this, it should be stressed once more that the ranking score 
system analyzed in this paper was initiated by the newspaper Trouw. So although the inputs of 
the Trouw rating were obtained from public authorities, the ranking system entailed a private 
initiative, without any threat of sanctions by the Inspectorate. Obviously, one may question the 
adequacy and transparency of the Trouw ranking formula, but it appears that this outlet receives 
more attention than the website of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. ‘Naming and shaming’ 
can thus be a substitute for public interventions, with exit and voice as its driving mechanisms. 
  The outcomes of our analysis also broaden our knowledge of the functioning of 
rankings and accountability systems in another aspect, namely by explicitly addressing the 
persistency of accountability effects. Our results indicate that schools that receive a negative 
score are triggered to improve their outcomes over longer time periods, with accountability 
incentives that can be qualified as ‘ex post’  that is, after the occurrence of receiving a low 
ranking. This contrasts to a situation where (all) schools would be fully informed on their 
relative performance and where the incentives of accountability would be set ex ante. Our 
results suggest that schools are not fully aware of their relative quality ranking instead, and 
respond information updates. 
  Finally, our results indicate that the room and for use of gaming activities after the 
introduction of the ranking system was only small. Within the context of the current analysis, 
schools could only ‘game’ the diploma quality indicator (and therefore the Trouw score.) by 
increasing the interim grade scores. More generally, it seems that the quality indicators that the 
Inspectorate of Education gathers information on are relatively gaming-proof.  
   20 
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